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What difference does it make, for purposes of asserting personal
jurisdiction, that a defendant has substantive legal ties with other parties
concededly subject to a court's jurisdiction? What effect do such affilia-
tions have on the constitutional limits contained in the "minimum con-
tacts" test' of "fair play and substantial justice"?2 In some situations,
they apparently makes no difference. If a defendant's biological parent is
subject to jurisdiction in a forum, it does not automatically subject the
defendant to suit, even though the parent-child relationship is a legal as
well as biological one. In other situations, a legal relationship does have
jurisdictional significance. If a corporate defendant's parent is subject to
suit, this may enhance the forum's ability to bring the corporate subsidi-
ary before its courts.
The increased importance of juridical entities in substantive law has
made such jurisdictional questions increasingly significant. Assume, for
example, that a corporate subsidiary operates a chemical manufacturing
plant in another country, and an accident at that installation creates
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A. 1970, University of California, Berkeley; J.D.
1976, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; LL.M. 1978, Columbia
University School of Law.
t Third-year student, Yale Law School. B.S. 1981, Florida State University; M.B.A. 1984,
Florida Atlantic University.
1. For a general discussion of the minimum contacts test, see Brilmayer, How Contacts Count,
1980 Sup. Cr. REv. 77.
2. The "fair play and substantial justice" test is taken, of course, from International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
enormous tort liability.3 The injured parties may prefer to bring suit in
the home state of the parent, perhaps because of the more favorable sub-
stantive law or perhaps because of the American system of contingent
fees. Can the subsidiary be sued in the United States, assuming that it
has no American contacts other than its American corporate parent? If
suit were brought in the subsidiary's home state, would jurisdiction over
the American parent be appropriate? What standards ought to apply?
We posit three methods by which substantive legal relations may
affect the jurisdictional balance. First, the legal relationship may be such
that it is reasonable to attribute the jurisdictional contacts of one party to
the other. Thus, the contacts that permit jurisdiction over the first party
may count against the second, establishing jurisdiction over that party
also. Second, the legal relationship between two apparently separate
entities may be such that in reality the two entities are one; their separate
identities are merged. The contacts of the first defendant are also con-
tacts of the second because there is in reality only one defendant. Third,
under some circumstances, the party over which there is jurisdiction may
be substituted for a party over which there is not. The plaintiff can sim-
ply choose to sue the affiliated party over which jurisdiction concededly
exists. These three theories-attribution, merger, and substitution-
explain how in some circumstances, jurisdiction over a legally related
entity can satisfy the constitutional minimum contacts test of the due
process clause. A series of Supreme Court cases illustrate the contexts in
which these issues arise.
I
BACKGROUND
No case, apparently, has considered the general relevance of sub-
stantive legal relations for personal jurisdiction. Specific instances, how-
ever, have been considered on a case-by-case basis. In particular, several
older precedents considered the problem in the context of the corporate
parent-subsidiary relationship. Because the leading case is Cannon Man-
ufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,4 this line of precedents is some-
times referred to as the "Cannon doctrine".5 In that case, Cannon sued
Cudahy, a Maine corporation, in North Carolina. The defendant replied
that it was not "doing business" in the state, as the then-current jurisdic-
tional test required.6 Process had been served in North Carolina upon an
3. The example is modeled on the litigation arising out of the Bhopal incident. Union
Carbide has been sued in the United States, while it is unclear whether its Indian subsidiary would
be subject to suit here.
4. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
5. See, eg., P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS 43-47 (1983) (discussing
Cannon doctrine).
6. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 334-35.
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JURISDICTION
agent of the Cudahy Packing Company of Alabama, over which jurisdic-
tion concededly existed. The argument for jurisdiction was based on
merger-that the two entities should be treated as one.7 Brandeis con-
ceded in the opinion that
[t]hrough ownership of the entire capital stock and otherwise, the defend-
ant dominates the Alabama corporation, immediately and completely;
and exerts its control both commercially and financially in substantially
the same way, and mainly through the same individuals, as it does over
those selling branches or departments of its business not separately incor-
porated which are established to market the Cudahy products in other
States.8
Yet because the corporations were different legal entities, the assertion of
jurisdiction was not allowed.
The existence of the Alabama company as a distinct corporate entity is,
however, in all respects observed. Its books are kept separate. All trans-
actions between the two corporations are represented by appropriate
entries in their respective books in the same way as if the two were
wholly independent corporations. This corporate separation from the
general Cudahy business was doubtless adopted solely to secure to the
defendant some advantage under the local laws.... The corporate sepa-
ration, though perhaps merely formal, was real.9
The Court cited precedents for the proposition that "such use of a sub-
sidiary does not necessarily subject the parent corporation to . . .
jurisdiction."1
For several reasons, the current authority of Cannon might be in
doubt. First, the opinion did not clearly state the basis for its holding.
Brandeis seemed to deny that any constitutional questions were
presented 1 and to suggest that the problem was that no state law or
congressional act authorized jurisdiction. 2 But at the same time, the
language quoted above seems to reflect some "natural law" of corpora-
tions asserting that formally separate corporations must always be
treated as separate. Second, the constitutional limitations on state court
jurisdiction have been drastically revised since 1924. In particular, since
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 13 "presence" has no longer been
an important test for amenability to suit. If Cannon is an artifact of the
7. Id. at 335.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 335, 337.
10. Id. at 336 (citing People's Tobacco v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); Peterson
v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 205 U.S. 364 (1907); Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406
(1903)).
11. Id. ("No question of the constitutional powers of the State, or of the federal Government,
is directly presented.").
12. Id.
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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"presence" test, it possibly has been superseded. For these reasons, and
others,14 it is commonly argued that Cannon has no constitutional rele-
vance today, if indeed it ever did.'"
On the other hand, it is plausible that to the extent Cannon ever had
constitutional significance, and it has been cited as constitutional author-
ity,16 its significance has not been eroded merely because other aspects of
the jurisdictional standard have changed. There are really two separate
jurisdictional questions. International Shoe primarily addressed one of
them, the issue of what type and quantity of contacts between the forum
and the defendant suffice for jurisdiction. In this respect, International
Shoe superseded the presence and doing business tests applied in Cannon.
But Cannon also dealt with a second question-whether contacts of a
quantity and type that would admittedly suffice for jurisdiction were
really the defendant's contacts. In post-International Shoe terms,
Cannon held that a subsidiary's contacts were not automatically a par-
ent's contacts. Whether this is actually the rule is, however, unclear.
International Shoe did not address this issue, except tangentially in
rather different circumstances,"7 and did not purport to overrule Cannon.
The Supreme Court has yet to consider explicitly the effect of the "fair
play and substantial justice" standard on Cannon-type problems. The
lower courts are understandably confused about how the two lines of
cases fit together.' 8
Several recent cases have implications for the jurisdictional rele-
vance of legal affiliations with an entity subject to suit. The first is
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.' 9 Attempting to obtain juris-
14. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 5, at 43-47.
15. See id. at 45-46 (citing 2 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 4.25 (2d ed. 1981); A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 112-18
(1959)).
16. See, eg., Consolidated Textile v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 88 (1933). Gregory, while citing
Cannon, also relied upon other cases that explicitly mentioned due process, such as International
Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 582 (1914) ("The Harvester Company appeared and moved to
quash the return [of an indictment], substantially upon the ground that service had not been made
upon an authorized agent of the company and that the company was not doing business within the
State of Kentucky, and it set up that any action under the attempted service would violate the due
process and commerce clauses of the Federal Constitution.").
See also Harris v. Deere & Co., 223 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1955); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Mohasco
Indus. 406 F. Supp. 738 (D. Mont. 1975); Wireline, Inc. v. Byron Jackson Tools, 239 F. Supp. 955
(D. Mont. 1964).
17. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945), the salesmen's
activities in Washington supplied the necessary contacts with International Shoe Co. for jurisdiction.
This decision exemplified attribution, as the court noted in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S.
Ct. 2174, 2186 n.22 (1985).
18. See Finance Co. of Am. v. Bankamerica Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895 (D. Md. 1980); Crow
Tribe of Indians v. Mohasco Indus. 406 F. Supp. 738 (D. Mont. 1975); Deere & Co. v. Walls, 148 So.
2d 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
19. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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JURISDICTION
diction over an out-of-state automobile dealer, the plaintiff argued that
the dealer chose to become part of a nationwide network of automobile
distributors located partly within the forum state. The majority did not
address this argument seriously, although one dissent found it persua-
sive.20 If accepted, the argument would suggest that other links between
defendants and business within the forum also ought to be relevant to
jurisdiction. However, the Court's rejection of the argument suggests at
least that some more intimate legal relationship must be found.
More interesting, and more seriously advanced, was an argument in
World-Wide Volkswagen's companion case, Rush v. Savchuk 21 The sub-
stantive legal relation in Rush was a contractual arrangement between
the defendant in an automobile accident case and his insurer. The
insurer was admittedly subject to jurisdiction in the forum, since it did
business there. The plaintiff sought to obtain jurisdiction over the
defendant by attachment of the insurer's obligation to defend the insured.
As in World- Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiff argued that a legal relation-
ship with an entity concededly subject to suit provided an adequate basis
for jurisdiction. The Court rejected the argument, holding that mini-
mum contacts had to be shown for each individual defendant.22
A subsequent case considered the relevance of legal affiliations in the
jurisdictional context more directly. It may amount, in fact, to an
explicit revival of the Cannon doctrine. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc.,23 suit was brought against a corporation, its holding company, and
that company's stockholder. While the Court upheld jurisdiction against
the corporation, a publisher, it remanded on the question of jurisdiction
over the other parties.
No effort had been made to show minimum contacts between those
parties and the forum directly; only minimum contacts with the pub-
lisher had been shown. The Court both cited precedents that had relied
upon Cannon24 and reiterated Rush's caution that minimum contacts
with each of the defendants must be shown.2" Furthermore, Keeton
clearly rested on constitutional and not state statutory grounds.26 The
opinion did not indicate, however, that the parent-subsidiary relationship
20. Id. at 314 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[J]urisdiction is premised on the deliberate and
purposeful actions of the defendants themselves in choosing to become part of a nationwide, indeed a
global, network for marketing and servicing automobiles.").
21. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
22. Id. at 332.
23. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). One of the authors was counsel of record for the defendant in this
case.
24. Id. at 781 n.13 (citing Consolidated Textile v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85 (1933), Peterson v.
Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 205 U.S. 364 (1907)).
25. Id.
26. It is well understood since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that federal courts
are not free to reexamine state decisions of "general common law". In Hustler Magazine, the state
1986]
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necesssarily would be irrelevant on remand, nor that formal corporate
separation might not be disregarded in appropriate instances.
In an even more recent case, the Court noted the jurisdictional sig-
nificance of substantive relationships, but declined to address it. In Bur-
ger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,27 a franchise agreement negotiated in
Michigan to operate a Michigan fast food restaurant gave rise to litiga-
tion in Florida. The franchisor's base of operations was in Florida, and
several facts connecting the dispute to Florida led the Court to uphold
jurisdiction.28 In a footnote, the Court mentioned a connection with the
forum that had been discussed by the appeals court: MacShara, the
cofranchisee of the defendant, Rudzewicz, had traveled to Florida to
attend Burger King University. The Eleventh Circuit found this fact
irrelevant to Rudzewicz's contacts to Florida because the two
cofranchisees had never formed a partnership and had signed the
franchise contract in their individual capacities.29
The Supreme Court, in contrast, noted that the two cofranchisees
later jointly formed a corporation. Furthermore, the two were required
to decide which one of them would make the necessary trip to Florida,
and Rudzewicz participated in the decision that MacShara would be the
one to go. The Court explained: "We have previously noted that when
commercial activities are 'carried on in behalf of' an out-of-state party
those activities may sometimes be ascribed to the party, . . . at least
where he is a 'primary participan[t]' in the enterprise and has acted pur-
posefully in directing those activities.""0 Nevertheless, the Court found
sufficient other contacts between Rudzewicz and Florida, concluding
that they "need not resolve the permissible bounds of such attribution. ' 31
This case law is at best fragmentary. The cases show that a substan-
tive legal relationship with a party over which jurisdiction exists is not
automatically sufficient to establish jurisdiction. But the persistent and
occasionally approving attention to arguments based on substantive rela-
tions suggests that under certain circumstances such arguments might be
successful. The overall picture is not very informative. One can only
conclude that legal relations are sometimes relevant and sometimes not
relevant.
statute in question had been interpreted to reach the limits of the federal constitution. 465 U.S. at
774 n.4.
27. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
28. For instance, payments were to be made in Florida and a choice of law clause in the
contract specified Florida law. Id. at 2178.
29. Burger King Corp. v. MaShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 n.14, rev'd sub nom. Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
30. Burger King 105 S. Ct. at 2186 n. 22. (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
31. Id.
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While the opinions offer little helpful general reasoning, they form
the parameters within which a general theory can be built. Moreover,
these cases do indicate both the breadth of the problem and a common
underlying fact pattern. In each of them, one entity is subject to jurisdic-
tion, a second arguably is not, and the plaintiff seeks to use the affiliation
between the two to establish jurisdiction that would otherwise not exist.
In Cannon and Hustler, the affiliation relied upon was the parent-subsidi-
ary relationship.32 In Rush, the affiliation was a contractual agreement
for indemnification and provision of a legal defense.33 In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the affiliation was the legal relationship among franchised
dealers within a nationwide system for selling and servicing
automobiles.34 In Burger King, the two defendants were part of a com-
mon business venture.35
We commence discussion of this common analytical pattern by con-
sidering the specific example of jurisdiction based upon the parent-sub-
sidiary relationship between two corporations. It is the clearest example
to visualize, and the large number of lower court cases raising the ques-
tion36 suggests that it is also the example of greatest current importance.
32. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335; Hustler, 465 U.S. at 781 n.13.
33. 444 U.S. at 328.
34. 444 U.S. at 314 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. 105 S. Ct. at 2186 n.22.
36. See, eg., Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., 504 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1974) (parent corporation has
a separate corporate existence and is treated separately from a subsidiary absent circumstances
justifying the disregard of the separate corporate status of each entity); Boryk v. De Havilland
Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965) (mere ownership of stock in New York subsidiary does not
subject foreign parent to jurisdiction in New York); Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines
Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964) (ownership of subsidiary by a foreign corporation does not by
itself make the foreign corporation subject to suit); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Cassel, 302 F.2d 132
(10th Cir. 1962) (state may assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation where
wholly owned subsidiary-distributor sold items for parent and parent assisted in promoting sales);
Harris v. Deere & Co., 223 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1955) (no jurisdiction over foreign parent corporation
based on service of process on wholly owned domestic subsidiary); Steinway v. Majestic Amusement
Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949) (mere ownership of domestic subsidiary by foreign parent not of a
substantial enough character for assertion of jurisdiction over foreign parent); Bellomo v.
Pennsylvania Life Co., 488 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (where subsidiary created for tax purposes
and there is no other basis for distinguishing between parent and subsidiary, personal jurisdiction
over the foreign parent is permissible); Roorda v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 F. Supp. 868 (D.S.C.
1979) (personal jurisdiction over foreign parent permissible where it exercises intimate and complete
control of domestic subsidiary); DCA Food Indus. Inc., v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 470 F. Supp.
574 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (personal jurisdiction over parent permissible where subsidiary acted as a
department of the foreign parent); Energy Reserves Group v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D.
Kan. 1978) (personal jurisidiction permissible where wholly owned domestic subsidiary did business
in forum on behalf of foreign parent); W. Clay Jackson Enter. v. Greyhound Leasing & Fin., 431 F.
Supp. 1229 (D.P.R. 1977) (personal jurisdiction permitted over foreign parent where domestic
subsidiary acted as agent and alter ego of parent); Top Form Mills, Inc. v. Sociedad Nationale
Industria Applicazioni Viscosa, 428 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (personal jurisdiction
permissible where subsidiary acted as agent of foreign parent); Stoehr v. American Honda Motor
Co., 429 F. Supp. 763 (D. Neb. 1977) (parent did not so dominate subsidiary that subsidiary could
be treated as an agent for service of process); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 406 F.
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As the succeeding sections will show, the principles at issue are analo-
gous when jurisdiction based on other legal affiliations is at issue.
II
JURISDICTION AND THE PARENT-SUBSIDIARY
RELATIONSHIP
There are many possible permutations of the due process problem of
parents and subsidiaries. To simplify, take a parent corporation, P,
which is based in one state, Pennsylvania, and a subsidiary, S, based in
South Dakota. Our discussion will assume that only these two states and
these two corporations are involved. Of course, the relationship of the
corporations may be more complicated than that between a wholly
owned subsidiary and its parent. There may be partial ownership, or the
two corporations might both be subsidiaries of the same corporation, or
there may be other attenuating circumstances in the relationship.
Another possible complication is the precise meaning of "Pennsylvania
corporation"-P might be incorporated there, have its principal place of
business there, or have other extensive affiliations with the state. For
purposes of this example assume that P is sufficiently local that it is sub-
ject to suit in Pennsylvania generally, on any cause of action regardless of
where it arose.37 The same holds true for S in South Dakota.
Another complication is whether jurisdiction is sought over the par-
ent by virtue of jurisdiction over the subsidiary, or vice versa. Initially,
we examine the former question, leaving the latter to be developed as a
corollary. We know that P can be sued in Pennsylvania; that is a conse-
quence not of P's relationship with S, but of the fact that Pennsylvania is
P's home base. The only situation where P's relationship with S
becomes crucial is where the forum can obtain jurisdiction over S but not
Supp. 738 (D. Mont. 1975) (formal separation between parent and subsidiary enough to defeat
personal jurisdiction under Cannon); Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
(where parent and subsidiary exchanged officers, employees, and directors and subsidiary distributed
parent's products, sufficient control existed to hold parent subject to jurisdiction for subsidiary's
contacts); Freeman v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers Inc., 398 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(parent exercised sufficient control over subsidiary that parent could be held subject to jurisdiction
for subsidiary's contacts with the forum); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md.
1975) (personal jurisdiction over foreign parent permissible where it exercised sufficient control over
domestic subsidiary); McPheron v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 390 F. Supp. 943 (D. Conn. 1975)
(wholly owned holding company and parent sufficiently separate so that no personal jurisdiction
over foreign parent permitted).
37. For example, extensive affiliations with a state not amounting to incorporation or principal
place of business might still give rise to jurisdiction where the cause of action arose elsewhere. See,
e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet
Mining, Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). For a discussion of the difference between general and specific
jurisdictions, see Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 80-88; Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. Rav. 1121, 1136 (1966).
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JURISDICTION
over P apart from its relationship with S. That means that the issue
arises when South Dakota is the forum.
A. Jurisdiction Over the Parent Based on Jurisdiction
Over the Subsidiary
Even if we focus on a suit against P brought in South Dakota, still
more variations are possible. In particular, there are two main questions:
(1) Where did the cause of action arise? (2) Who is the principal defend-
ant, P or S? By where the cause of action arose, we mean where the
injury or the activities leading up to it occurred, although obviously this
is not an unproblematic notion.3" By principal defendant, we mean the
defendant that is primarily liable as a substantive matter, the one against
which suit unproblematically can be brought. These different situations
are reflected in the two-by-two matrix in Figure 1 representing the two
possibilities as to where the cause of action accrued, and the two pos-
sibilities as to the identity of the primary defendant.
FIGURE 1
CAN P BE SUED IN SOUTH DAKOTA?
A B
------------------------------- where action arose ---------------------------






1. jurisdiction is A 1  B1
sought (easy case) (Cannon)
(parent)
Party over whom
2. jurisdiction already A2exists (Hustler) B2
(subsidiary)
Column A includes all the cases where the injury complained of is
located in the forum. South Dakota is attempting to assert only specific
jurisdiction over P in those cases. By contrast, column B represents cases
38. This is well illustrated, of course, by the difficulties the concept has engendered in the
context of choice of law. For a general critique, see B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
in which South Dakota is attempting to assert general jurisdiction over P.
Specific jurisdiction is jurisdiction over a cause of action that arose
within the state, while general jurisdiction involves a relationship
between the forum and the defendant giving the forum power to litigate
any cases that the defendant may be party to, regardless of where those
cases arose. This difference is crucial in that a substantially greater quan-
tum of contacts is necessary to establish general jurisdiction than to
establish specific jurisdiction. Thus, it is easier to get jurisdiction in col-
umn A than column B.
When a cause of action arises in South Dakota, either P or S may be
the primary defendant. The interesting problems arise in A 2 where S is
the primary defendant-that is, S engaged in the activities that led to a
suit against S and P. Permutation A I is not interesting because jurisdic-
tion over P exists regardless of its relationship with S.39 In that scenario,
P directly caused the harm in South Dakota without using S as the pri-
mary actor, which establishes an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction
over P directly.' P's relationship with S is unlikely to add substantially
to this important contact with South Dakota unless P's relationship with
S has some bearing on the substantive dispute in question.
The other possibility is that a cause of action arises outside of South
Dakota, in Pennsylvania. If the cause of action arises in Pennsylvania,
the injury does not count as a contact for jurisdiction over P in South
Dakota even if P is the primary defendant, simply because an injury in
Pennsylvania is not a contact with South Dakota at all. Because the
injury itself is not a jurisdictional contact with the forum, it does not
matter for jurisdictional purposes which corporation was primarily
responsible for it.
However, the identity of the primary defendant will matter for sub-
stantive purposes. Row 2, where S, the South Dakota subsidiary, is the
primary defendant, includes all the cases in which the plaintiff will face
substantive problems of attributing liability to P, the Pennsylvania par-
ent, in addition to any difficulties in establishing jurisdiction over P. This
is so because the plaintiff is attempting to sue an entity that is not primar-
ily liable for the injury but is at most only liable for the activities of
another entity. Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.4 falls
under category B, because the parent was the primary defendant, the one
causing the injury to the plaintiff, and because the cause of action did not
39. The main exception would be cases where the harm was insufficiently foreseeable. See, e.g.,
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). For a discussion of the peculiar
foreseeability problems of substantive relations, see infra text accompanying notes 167-75.
40. For instance, a single contact may be sufficient where it gives rise to the cause of action.
See, eg., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
41. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
[Vol. 74:1





























i t li i j i i tion . i
i t
l li l t ti iti f
n f turing . . ing O.41
1 t t t i f t, t
i t i j t t l i ti , t f ti i t
. i ti l s s r t r as i s fficie tl f reseea le. ee, e.g.,
rl - i e l s r . . s , . . ( ). r a isc ssi f t e ec liar
f r s ilit r l s f s st ti relati s, see i fr te t acc a ying tes - .
. r i st , si l t t s ffi i t ere it i es rise t t e ca se f acti .
ee, e. ., c ee v. International ife Ins. o., 355 . . 220 (1957).
. . . ( ).
JURISDICTION
arise in the forum.42 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,4 3 in contrast, falls
under category A 2 because the subsidiary was the primary defendant and
the injury occurred in the forum. 4 Cases in column A, where the cause
of action arises in the forum, South Dakota, are easier cases for plaintiffs
to gain jurisdiction than cases in column B, where the cause of action
arises out of state. Cases in row 1, where P is the primary defendant, are
easier cases to prevail on the merits against P than cases in row 2.
Concrete examples illustrating these fact patterns suggest conditions
under which assertion of jurisdiction is appropriate. As already noted,
A1, where P is the primary defendant in a cause of action arising in the
forum, South Dakota, probably will be easy even without reference to the
substantive affiliation between P and S.4 5  Next consider pattern A 2.
There the subsidiary has performed some action in the forum giving rise
to legal liability. Can the parent be sued in South Dakota? It seems that
P at least should be subject to suit in the forum if it directed S to engage
in the activities giving rise to S's liability there. After all, had P hired an
individual outside the corporation to engage in such activities in South
Dakota, P would have been amenable to suit if the contractor had then
caused injury in the course of carrying out those activities.46 This is the
general principle of attribution, alluded to in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz47 and employed in the context of a relationship between par-
ent and subsidiary. The parent-subsidiary relationship is simply the vehi-
cle by which the parent caused the subsidiary to carry out its own wishes,
which then lead to injury.
Cases BI and B 2, where the causes of action arise outside the forum,
are more difficult because South Dakota must establish general jurisdic-
tion. It has general jurisdiction over S, as we hypothesized at the outset.
In order to get general jurisdiction over P, however, it must show contin-
uous and systematic contacts With P. These contacts are unlikely to be
shown by the simple fact that P owns assets-that is, stock in S-in
South Dakota.4" Instead, the plaintiff may try to establish jurisdiction
over P by arguing that S and P are in reality the same company. Had S
been a branch or division, jurisdiction over P would have been appropri-
42. The Cannon opinion did not mention where the contract for cotton sheeting was entered
into.
43. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
44. According to the Court's reasoning, the injury also occurred in every other state, since it
was an intangible injury to reputation and the magazines were circulated nationwide. Hustler
Magazine, 465 U.S. at 777.
45. See supra text accompanying note 40.
46. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2186 n.22 (1985) (citing
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
47. Id.
48. Cf. Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (stock ownership not adequate basis for
jurisdiction over corporate derivative suit against management).
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ate.49 The plaintiff may argue that P and S's relationship is more similar
to that of branches or divisions within a corporation than that of distinct
corporations. If the two entities are really the same, all of S's local activ-
ities are also contacts that P has with the forum. Since these contacts
suffice to establish jurisdiction over S, they also will suffice to establish
jurisdiction over P.
These two methods for establishing jursidiction involve showing
either that the absent parent instigated the subsidiary's local activities or
that the absent parent and the subsidiary are in fact a single legal entity.
The first method we call attribution, the second merger. They are obvi-
ously similar in that both involve disregarding separate entity status and
shifting responsibility for the subsidiary's actions onto the parent. The
difference between attribution and merger lies in the extent of this shift-
ing of responsibility. Under the attribution theory, only the precise con-
duct shown to be instigated by the parent is attributed to the parent; the
rest of the subsidiary's actions still pertain only to the subsidiary. The
two corporations remain distinct entities. If merger is shown, however,
all of the activities of the subsidiary are by definition activities of the
parent. Merger requires a greater showing of interconnectedness than
attribution, but once shown, its scope is broader. Under both theories,
the parent is declared responsible for in-state activities of the subsidiary,
but in attribution the responsibility results from causing a separate legal
entity to act while in merger there is no separate legal entity at all.
We have illustrated attribution in case A2, where a foreign parent is
subject to suit in a cause of action arising in the forum in which the
domestic subsidiary is the primary defendant. We also have illustrated
merger in cases B1 and B 2, where the cause of action arises outside the
forum. But merger might be an available theory in A2, and attribution an
available theory in B, and B2. Though it must be hard to prove, merger
might be used in A2, where the subsidiary caused harm in the forum,
because the two corporations might not have separate entity status. For
example, there might be reasons, such as undercapitalization, to disre-
gard the formal corporate boundaries, in which case jurisdiction over the
parent would follow automatically.
Conversely, attribution might be used to support general jurisdiction
in cases B, and B2 , where the cause of action arises outside the forum. If
enough of the subsidiary's activities are attributable to the parent, such
continuous and systematic activity in the forum (even though performed
through a separate corporate entity) might subject the parent to general
jurisdiction. Even though the subsidiary's formal entity status might be
recognized, the parent may have transacted enough business in the forum
49. See, ag., DCA Food Indus. v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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JURISDICTION
through its subsidiary that general jurisdiction over the parent would be
appropriate.
B. Jurisdiction Over the Subsidiary by Virtue of Jurisdiction over the
Parent
This discussion has been framed in terms of jurisdiction in South
Dakota over the parent, P, a Pennsylvania corporation, based upon its
affiliation with the subsidiary, S, a South Dakota corporation. Our anal-
ysis changes only slightly when jurisdiction over S is sought on the
grounds of its relation with P. The relevant question is: Can S be sued in
Pennsylvania? Comparable permutations occur because the two relevant
questions remain the same:
(1) Where did the cause of action arise? (2) Who is the primary
defendant? These issues determine whether specific or general jurisdic-
tion is sought, and thus the quantum of contact that must be shown.
Figure 2 shows a matrix of these permutations.
FIGURE 2
CAN S BE SUED IN PENNSYLVANIA?
A B
-------------- --- where action arose --------------






1. whom jurisdiction A1  B,
is sought (easy case) (Bhopal)
(subsidiary)
Party against
2. whom jurisdiction A2  B2exists
(parent)
As in the previous discussion, if merger can be shown, S is subject to
suit because of P's contacts with the forum, Pennsylvania. Legal identity
of two superficially distinct entities is a symmetric relationship; to say
that S is identical with P means also that P is identical with S. In any
situation where merger would allow jurisdiction over P in South Dakota
based on its affiliation with S, merger would allow jurisdiction over S
1986"1
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
based on its affiliation with P. Thus, where the merger theory is used, it
does not matter whether the in-state corporation is the parent or the
subsidiary.
Where attribution is the theory, a nearly identical result ensues. If P
is engaged in substantial forum activities, or in less substantial activities
that give rise to the legal injury in the forum, the test is whether P's
actions were attributable to S. The standard for attribution should be the
same. The standard is less likely to be satisfied, however, because a sub-
sidiary ordinarily engages in activities at its parent's request rather than
vice versa. Consequently, the parent-subsidiary relationship is asymetric
in that the parent controls the subsidiary to a greater degree than the
subsidiary controls the parent. Thus, while the attribution test is the
same, the legal relationship between the parties will be less probative of
whether the absent defendant controlled the activities taking place in the
forum. Still, the fact of a corporate relationship may help to show the
subsidiary's control over the parent's activities in that the parent may be
inclined to further the interests of its subsidiaries in many situations and
therefore to act at their behest.
With the notions of merger and attribution in mind, we can refine
the questions that should have been asked in Cannon and Hustler Maga-
zine. First, are the parent and subsidiary really separate entities or
should all of the subsidiary's connections with the forum be counted as
connections between the parent and forum as well? In other words,
should their formal independent entity status be observed, or should the
two entities be merged? Second, were the particular activities in which
the subsidiary engaged in the forum attributable to the parent, even
assuming that separate entity status ought to be respected? If so, were
these activities substantial enough to support jurisdiction, given that the
necessary quantum of activity varies with the activity's relationship to
the cause of action?
The notions of merger and attribution have obvious parallels to sub-
stantive law. The issue of jurisdictional merger is comparable to the cor-
porate law question of piercing the corporate veil. Where two
corporations do not maintain the requisite formal separation, a legal lia-
bility ascribed to one may be satisfied against the other."0 This theory of
substantive liability can be contrasted with a narrower theory of substan-
tive liability, which corresponds to our category of attribution. If a cor-
poration incites or motivates another to engage in actionable conduct, it
may be liable for its responsibility in causing the harm. The two corpora-
tions are not declared to be identical for all purposes; their separate
entity status is preserved. The actions of one are attributed to the other
50. See N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 18, at 86-87 (2d ed. 1971).
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JURISDICTION
only for the limited purpose of finding liability for particular acts. The
precise relationship between these substantive law doctrines and the
jurisdictional notions of merger and attribution will be discussed at
greater length below."1
III
BEYOND THE PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIP
Merger is a direct consequence of the parent-subsidiary relationship,
and cannot be exported beyond that relationship into the context ofjuris-
diction over human beings. Two human beings, no matter how closely
connected, cannot be declared identical to one another. Only with
abstract juridical entities, such as corporations,52 can two entities be
deemed merged into one. In fact, not all corporations are susceptible to
merger; it is only when there is some ownership relationship that the law
will pierce the corporate veil. With natural persons and many other
juridical entities, it is impossible to merge a defendant beyond the court's
jurisdiction with a defendant within the court's jurisdiction. In this
respect, the parent-subsidiary problem is a special case.
The attribution theory, in contrast, applies to other legal affiliations
as well as to the parent-subsidiary relationship. A defendant may moti-
vate or help another defendant to commit acts in the forum. In the par-
ent-subsidiary context, the ownership relationship was the vehicle
through which assistance or motivation was achieved. But substantive
law recognizes other affiliations with comparable consequences. Two
such affiliations are the principal-agent relationship and the relationship
between coconspirators. Another is a cluster of affiliations loosely
grouped under the heading of "vicarious liability". 3
In addition to attribution, there are situations where one defendant
may be substituted for another. Again, the common fact pattern includes
one defendant concededly subject to jurisdiction and a second arguably
beyond the forum's reach. In such circumstances, it may be possible to
sue the first defendant even though the cause of action runs more appro-
priately against the other. One example is the direct action statute,
51. See infra Part IV.
52. Partnerships also might be merged, although the facts that would lead one to do so are
hard to imagine. Similarly, two conspiracies might be merged if they had some common nucleus.
Note that only two comparable entities (e.g., two conspiracies or two corporations) can be merged,
while attribution is possible between different sorts of entities.
53. While we will not discuss vicarious liability at length, it fits within the attribution approach
in the same way as does agency. For example, some states impose civil liability upon social hosts
who serve liquor to inebriated guests who thereafter commit torts. An automobile rental agency
may be liable for the torts of the driver. Conceptually, these are similar to agency relationships in
that the secondary defendant is held liabile for the torts of the primary defendant. For discussion of
some such cases, see infra Part IV, Section B.
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
which allows suit against the insurer instead of the named insured. We
will discuss the various attribution theories first, before turning to the
mechanism of substitution.
A. Attribution: Agency and Principal
Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn54 exemplifies the theory of
attribution in the principal-agent context. In March of 1967, Robert
Franklyn, a California art collector, received a catalogue of art from the
well-known New York auctioneer Parke-Bernet Galleries. Dr. Franldyn
became interested in one of the paintings listed, Les Baigneurs by Roger
de la Fresnaye, and wrote to the gallery submitting a bid for the forth-
coming auction. On the day before the auction, he contacted the gallery
by phone and requested that "telephonic communication be established
between myself and [Parke-Bernet] during the course of the bidding' 5
so that he might participate. This conversation was confirmed by tele-
gram. Dr. Franklyn's written bid was the highest for Les Baigneurs and
during the auction he also submitted by phone the high bid on a painting
by Paul Klee. 6
When Dr. Franklyn did not respond to Parke-Bernet's bill for
ninety-six thousand dollars, Parke-Bernet brought suit in New York.
Probably few observers of the personal jurisdiction case reports would
have had sympathy for his defense of lack of jurisdiction; neither did the
New York Court of Appeals. The court upheld jurisdiction under the
New York long-arm statute providing jurisdiction over "'any nondomi-
ciliary... who, in person or through an agent... transacts any business
within the state' as to any cause of action arising from such
transaction. 5 7
Although treated as a matter of statutory construction, the case
illustrates attribution in the context of principals and agents. The court
first noted that it might well be argued that the defendant, on his own
initiative, projected himself into the auction room by actively participat-
ing in the bidding. 8 For this reason, Dr. Franklyn might be said to have
transacted business "in person" in New York. However, the court also
provided an important second rationale-that there would be substantial
basis for jurisdiction even if the personal participation were disregarded.
The Parke-Bernet employee who assisted in placing bids was considered
the defendant's agent during the auction. Although still a Parke-Bernet
54. 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970).
55. Id. at 15, 256 N.E.2d at 507, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
56. Id. at 15-16, 256 N.E.2d at 507, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 338-39.
57. Id. at 16, 256 N.E.2d at 507, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 339 (referring to N.Y. CIV. PRAC. R.
302(a)(1) (Consol. 1963)).
58. Id. at 18, 256 N.E.2d at 508, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
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JURISDICTION
employee, he had been "loaned" to Frandyn at the time of the auction,
and "[a] servant in the general employment of one person, who is tempo-
rarily loaned to another person to do the latter's work, becomes, for the
time being, the servant of the borrower." 9 Since the defendant had
transacted business in New York through an agent, the court held that
jurisdiction existed.
Parke-Bernet Galleries falls under category A 2 of the matrix set out
earlier, reproduced here in Figure 3 to reflect the principal-agent rela-
tionship. As with the earlier version of the matrix, cases in column A,
where the cause of action arises in the forum, are easier for jurisdictional
purposes, and cases in row 2.provide the plaintiff with substantive as well
as jurisdictional difficulties. In Parke-Bernet Galleries the cause of action
arose in the forum, and the agent was the immediate cause of the activi-
ties giving rise to the litigation. Here, as in the parent-subsidiary context,
asserting jurisdiction is no problem when the activities in the forum both
gave rise to the litigation and were brought about by the principal, acting
through the agent. Attribution makes jurisdiction proper.
As indicated in the Figure 3, National Equipment Rental v. Szuk-
hent6" and Bryant v. Finnish National Airline61 exemplify category B 1.
In Szukhent, a transaction centered principally in Michigan6 2 was the
basis for a suit brought in New York. 'By contract, the defendants had
agreed to appoint a New York resident as their agent for service of pro-
cess in the event of suit.63 The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction. In
Bryant, the defendant's activities in Paris injured the plaintiff, who
brought suit in New York alleging that the defendant maintained an
office in that city. Because employees in the New York office were
"doing business" on Finnish National Airline's behalf, the New York
Court of Appeals sustained jurisdiction in accordance with the New
York long arm statute."
It is widely accepted that attribution of an agent's behavior is appro-
priate in jurisdictional analysis.65 In particular, corporations are juridi-
59. Id. at 19, 256 N.E.2d at 509, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (quoting Hartell v. T.H. Simonson & Son
Co., 218 N.Y. 345, 349, 113 N.E. 255, 256 (1916)).
60. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
61. 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
62. The contract purported to establish that the transaction was entered into in New York.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 313 n.3.
63. The agent, in fact, was an employee of the plaintiff's in New York. Id. at 317. An
interesting issue, dealt with briefly infra at text accompanying notes 106-08, concerns whose law
determines whether such an appointment ought to be effective.
64. It is an open question whether Bryant survives Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), not because of the problem of attribution but because of the one of
needed quantum of contacts for general jurisdiction.
65. See, eg., Marsh v. Kitchen, 480 F.2d 1270, 1272-73 (2d Cir. 1973) (false arrest action in
New York against Missouri defendants dismissed for lack of jurisdiction where defendants never
entered New York and officers in New York were not agents of defendant); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle,
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Party over whom B,
1. jurisdiction is A1 (Szukhent and
sought (easy case) Bryant v. Finnish
(principal) National Airline)
Party over whom A 2
2. jurisdiction exists (Parke-Bernet) B2
(agent)
cal entities that can act only through agents. 6 An identical attribution
analysis therefore applies, although it uses the formal concepts of princi-
pal and agency instead of the formal relationship of parent and subsidi-
ary. The in-state party is the agent of the out-of-state defendant over
whom jurisdiction is sought if the out-of-stater has control over the local
in-stater based on a contractual or employment relationship. The local's
activities then may be attributed to the out-of-stater, and the contacts
409 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1969) (corporation's action against two former nonresident
employees dismissed for lack of jurisdiction where neither defendant engaged in activities in forum
state sufficient to permit jurisdiction); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 244 (2d
Cir.) (nonresident manager of nonresident corporation who had personal agents in New York is
subject to jurisdiction under New York long-arm statute for action concerning transactions of the
agents), cert denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966); Felicia, Ltd. v. Gulf Am. Barge, Ltd., 555 F. Supp. 801,
805-06 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (Florida partnership properly subject to jurisdiction in Illinois in action for
breach of contract where contract was entered into by specific partners acting as agents of the
partnership); Arcata Graphics Corp. v. Murrays Jewelers & Distrib., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 469, 472
(W.D.N.Y. 1974) (defendant Delaware corporation subject to jurisdiction in New York where
merchandising association representing defendant acted in New York); Sparrow v. Goodman, 376
F. Supp. 1268, 1271 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (principal may be subject to jurisdiction on account of the acts
of an agent acting within the scope of his authority); City of Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 289 F.
Supp. 723, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (foreign corporation that does a substantial portion of its business
through a domestic distributor may be subject to jurisdiction where it controlled some of the
distributor's business decisions); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp. 393, 398 (E.D.S.C.)
(defendant foreign corporation subject to jurisdiction in South Carolina due to presence of a
distributor in South Carolina), affid, 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965); La Porte Heinekamp Motor Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 24 F.2d 861, 864 (D. Md. 1928) (defendant motor company subject to jurisdiction
in Maryland due to presence and activities of an agent in Maryland though defendant was not
"doing business" in Maryland).
66. United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795, 804 (1948).
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JURISDICTION
thus assigned to the out-of-stater are assessed against the jurisdictional
standard. Whether few or many contacts are required depends upon
whether the cause of action arose from the in-state activities.
Also, as with attribution based upon the parent-subsidiary relation-
ship, it is more plausible to impute the contacts of the agent to the princi-
pal than vice versa. Agents act on behalf of their principals, to whom
their activities are attributed. In some circumstances attribution might
work the other way, so that the principal might perform an action at the
request of the agent. Normally, however, control is assymetric, so that it
will be easier to show jurisdiction over the principal based upon the
agent's actions than the converse.
B. Attribution and Conspiracy
Jurisdiction based on conspiracy theory is a relatively new phenom-
enon. Although the first allegation of jurisdiction based on civil conspir-
acy dates back to the 1940's,67 it was not until the 1970's that this
method of jurisdictional attribution became prevalent." Its legitimacy
has been the focus of a number of recent articles.6 9
The basic premise of civil conspiracy is the tort law principle that a
conspirator is legally responsible for all acts of his coconspirators in fur-
therance of the conspiracy. 70 This principle is generally accepted.7 The
act of conspiring, itself, does not give rise to civil liability.72 Rather, civil
conspiracy doctrine provides means to hold liable for plaintiff's injury all
those who acted in concert with the principal defendant.7" A conspirator
who performs an act in furtherance of the conspiracy does so as a general
agent of his or her coconspirators.74 The question posed here is whether
this "agency" relationship should result in jurisdiction over the cocon-
spirators. Plaintiffs have argued that because coconspirators act as
agents of one another for purposes of substantive liability, the acts of a
coconspirator in the forum should be attributed to other coconspirators
67. Giusti v. Pyrotechnic Indus., 156 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 787 (1946).
68. See, ag., Grove Press, Inc. v. Angleton, 649 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1981); Lott v. Burning Tree
Club, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 913 (D.D.C. 1980); Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086 (S.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, 624 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1980); Professional Investors Life Ins. Co., v. Roussel, 445 F.
Supp. 687 (D. Kan. 1978); McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513 (D. Md. 1977); Mandelkorn
v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973).
69. See Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish In Personam Jurisdiction: A Due
Process Analysis, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 234 (1983); Note, The Long Arm and Multiple Defendants:
The Conspiracy Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 84 COLUM. L. Rav. 506 (1984).
70. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 46, at 323-24 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
71. Id.
72. See McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 525 (D. Md. 1977).
73. Id.
74. Althouse, supra note 69, at 235 (citing Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 327 F.
Supp. 1267, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1971), af'd, 511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975)).
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
and therefore jurisdiction over one should create jurisdiction over all.75
Hyde v. United States,76 a criminal case, illustrates the approach.
The defendants, along with their attorney, had conspired in California to
defraud the federal government of lands in California and Oregon. Their
attorney performed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy in Washington,
D.C. The Supreme Court held that these acts conferred jurisdiction in
the District of Columbia courts over all of the indicted conspirators, even
though there had been no showing that the defendants had any other
contacts with the District of Columbia."
In civil cases, reactions to conspiracy allegations have been more
varied and uncertain. A very conservative approach was taken in
Kipperman v. McCone.78 The plaintiff brought a class action against the
United States and a number of federal officials alleging that they had
unlawfully opened her mail. Personal jurisdiction was sought based on
conspiracy principles. 79 The court held that jurisdiction must be pre-
mised upon forum-related acts personally committed by the nonresi-
dent. o Mandelkorn v. Patrick"' illustrates the opposite end of the
spectrum. The court there held that if the plaintiff's complaint alleges
both an actionable conspiracy and substantial acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy in the forum, jurisdiction is proper.8 2
Most courts follow an intermediate approach that uses attribution
based on conspiracy principles in a case-by-case analysis.8 3 One example
is Turner v. Baxley. 4 There, the court held that an act done in further-
ance of the conspiracy alone is insufficient to assert personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident conspirator.85 The court required additionally that
the nonresident know or have reason to know that the conspiracy would
have an effect in the state.8 6
Courts have struggled to find some basis for holding the attribution
of in-state activities reasonable. While they have differed on the question
of whether the legal relationship between coconspirators suffices, they all
75. Althouse, supra note 69, at 235; see also Guisti v. Pyrotechnic Indus., 156 F.2d 351 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 787 (1946).
76. 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
77. Id. at 363-64.
78. 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
79. Id. at 873.
80. Id. at 873 n.14.
81. 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973). It should be noted that this case might be anomalous
because the defendant in Mandelkorn failed properly to controvert the conspiracy allegation. Id. at
695.
82. Mandelkorn, 359 F. Supp. at 695.
83. See Althouse, supra note 69, at 242.
84. 354 F. Supp. 963 (D. Vt. 1972).
85. Id. at 977.
86. See Aithouse, supra note 69, at 245-46 (citing Turner, 354 F. Supp. at 977).
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JURISDICTION
clearly have been engaged in analyses of attribution. The relevant con-
siderations in the conspiracy context are no different from those in the
agency context; the crucial factors are the same. The conspiracy cases,
however, highlight that attribution is not so easy to determine. Is it fair
automatically to impute the activities of one coconspirator to another?
Under certain circumstances, reasonable persons will disagree about how
to apply the standard. The courts then must find or fashion a test for
separating cases where attribution is appropriate from those where it is
not. This same exercise also may be necessary when attribution analysis
is applied to borderline cases involving a parent-subsidiary or principal-
agent relationship.
C. Substitution
Before turning to a more exhaustive examination of the precise con-
tours of attribution, it is useful to describe the substitution method of
using substantive relations to establish jurisdiction. In certain circum-
stances a defendant over whom jurisdiction concededly exists may be
substituted for a defendant over whom jurisdiction arguably does not
exist. Substitution is different from both merger and attribution. Merger
is appropriate where the entities are legally identical, and attribution is
appropriate where activities of one are also the responsibility of the other.
Substitution provides neither that the entities are identical, nor that they
are responsible for each other's actions. The plaintiff simply abandons
the effort to obtain jurisdiction over the absent defendant, choosing to
sue the defendant who is present instead.
The most prominent example of substitution in the jurisdictional
context is the so-called "Seider jurisdiction.""7 A typical Seider-type
case involves a primary defendant who purchases an automobile insur-
ance policy from the secondary defendant. The insurer is concededly
subject to jurisdiction in the forum because it does business there. Juris-
diction over the primary defendant would be easy if the accident had
occurred within the forum. But assume a resident files suit based upon a
cause of action that did not arise within the forum. The suit could not be
maintained in the forum without a finding of general jurisdiction over the
defendant. For general jurisdiction the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's contacts were "systematic and continuous."88 If the primary
defendant's only contact with the forum were the purchase of an insur-
ance policy with a company that does business there, it would be insuffi-
cient for general jurisdiction. If, however, the court were to focus instead
on the insurance company, jurisdiction would be valid because the com-
87. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
88. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1945); see also J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.10, at 125 (1985).
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
pany does business in the forum. The legitimacy of so doing, obviously,
was the issue in Rush v. Savchuk.8 9
There are several ways to attempt to shift the focus to the contacts
of the insurance company. The first would be to try to obtain jurisdiction
over the primary defendant by either of the methods already described-
attributing to him or her the insurer's contacts or merging the two into a
single entity. The focus would be on the insurer's contacts as contacts
also of the insured. Rush held that the contacts of the insured and the
insurer ordinarily could not be aggregated or attributed to the named
defendant. 90 As the Court pointed out, the insured was not responsible
for where the insurance company did business. 91
Another possibility is to shift the substantive liability to the defend-
ant that has the jurisdictional contacts, rather than shifting the jurisdic-
tional contacts to the party with the substantive liability. The plaintiff's
goal is to locate a defendant who has both jurisdictional contacts and
substantive liability. Shifting the substantive liability fulfills this goal
equally as well as shifting jurisdictional contacts. But in Rush the plain-
tiff was not allowed to substitute the insurance company as the sole
defendant. The Court maintained that the insured was the real party in
interest,92 despite insistence by the dissent that only the insurance com-
pany would feel the impact of the suit.93
Were Rush the whole story, it might bode ill for substitution as a
jurisdictional theory. But Rush suggested an exception, and courts have
taken advantage of it. In Rush the Court pointed out that the forum did
not have a direct action statute for domestic purposes; the jurisdiction
used its "judicially created direct action statute" only to obtain jurisdic-
tion.94 In at least one case since Rush, Puerto Rico v. S.S Zoe Coloco-
troni,95 jurisdiction has been upheld under a direct action statute that
applied to domestic and foreign causes of action alike. In that case, an
oil tanker ran aground on a reef near Puerto Rico. As the ship attempted
to get off the reef, it dumped its oil. Oil that floated ashore caused exten-
sive damage. The court used the direct action statute to substitute par-
ties and allowed the action to proceed.96
In conjunction with Rush, S.S. Zoe Colocotroni suggests that domes-
tic substantive law provides the key to substitution. Substitution can be
authorized only by the appropriate kind of domestic substantive legisla-
89. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
90. Id. at 331-32.
91. Id. at 329.
92. Id. at 331.
93. Id. at 333-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 330-31 nn.18-19.
95. 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
96. Id. at 667-70.
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96. ld. at 667-70.
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tion. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how substitution might proceed with-
out some substantive rule. If jurisdiction does not exist as to the primary
defendant, what is the source of the right simply to switch defendants? A
plaintiff cannot simply pick a second defendant from the air, and decide
that he or she would be a good party to sue because he or she is subject to
the forum's jurisdiction. Thus, a substantive theory that ties the secon-
dary defendant into the case is needed.
Another example illustrates how substitution turns on domestic sub-
stantive law. Assume that the plaintiff was injured by medical malprac-
tice and wishes to sue both doctors involved in her surgery. If the two
defendants are joint tortfeasors, the plaintiff has a choice about which
one to sue. As a jurisdictional matter, she is free to choose to sue only
the defendant over whom jurisdiction is available (although this may not
be a wise litigation strategy), rather than traveling to a forum in which
jurisdiction is available over both. This would be true even if, as a factual
matter, it seemed more likely that the absent doctor actually caused the
harm.9 7 However, she cannot choose instead to sue the hospital simply
because jurisdiction over it is possible, unless the hospital is potentially
substantively liable.
From this perspective, substitution turns upon a question of local
substantive law, which specifies who is a proper party to the suit. Sub-
stantive law specifies the two doctors as appropriate defendants. Substi-
tution has to be a matter of substantive law, because there must be some
basis for shifting the substantive liability to the party over whom jurisdic-
tion concededly exists. Rush suggests that, at least in the substitution
context, only a bona fide domestic substantive rule will suffice. The so-
called "judicially created direct action statute" that it invalidated was
defective in that it created a quasi-substantive rule whose only purpose
was to expand the forum's jurisdiction. Thus, quasi-substantive doc-
trines created for jurisdictional purposes are not good enough for juris-
diction by substitution.
The same issue of whether a quasi-substantive rule will suffice arises
in the context of merger and attribution. Piercing the corporate veil is a
substantive law concept that parallels the merger theory of jurisdiction.
Agency law and conspiracy law, similarly, deal with attribution for sub-
stantive purposes. Like substitution, these rules have important substan-
tive characteristics. One cannot simply link together defendants
capriciously so that a defendant not otherwise subject to the forum's
power is tarred with the same jurisdictional brush as those who are.
There must be some reason to link them together; some rule that specifies
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 882 (1977); PROSSER & KEETON. supra note 70,
§ 47, at 327-28 (5th ed. 1984).
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
that the defendants may be treated as a unit or their activities imputed to
one another.
This raises an important question: Can only bona fide substantive
rules, and not quasi-substantive jurisdictional expedients, be employed to
gain jurisdiction? In addition, to what degree should jurisdictional rules
be limited by the precise contours of analogous substantive law? Is
merger analysis constrained by substantive veil-piercing doctrine? Is
attribution constrained by substantive laws regulating agency, conspir-
acy, vicarious liability, and the like? These questions will be addressed in
the next section.
IV
SOURCE AND CONTENT OF ATTRIBUTION, MERGER,
AND SUBSTITUTION
To this point, we have been purposefully vague about the precise
source of the requirements for merger, attribution, and substitution. Are
they state or federal standards? Courts have not addressed this deeper
issue, although some mention related issues in passing. 8 Typically,
courts treat interpretation of these jurisdictional requirements as issues of
first impression, for which no source need be found.
Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,9 9 for example,
seemed to proceed on self-evident first principles about corporate formal-
ities and corporate separateness." Perhaps because concepts such as
agency and veil piercing feel so familiar, or perhaps because national law
schools encourage us to think in such terms, it seems possible to think
about such questions as though there were some "general common law"
to consult for answers. But there is no general common law. These doc-
trines vary in their precise contours from state to state, and it is necessary
to ascribe a source if only to resolve such conflicts. Only by identifying a
source will we know which precedents are authoritative, and only then
can we decide difficult borderline cases about whether the substantive
legal relationship supports jurisdiction.
Consider the example of corporate veil piercing as a basis for juris-
98. See, eg., National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). The Court considered
the issue of whether state or federal law defined agency for purposes of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d), which
provides for service of process upon "an agent authorized by appointment... to receive service of
process." Id. at 316. The Court relied upon "well settled general principles of the law of agency,"
and noted that it dealt with a federal rule (apparently suggesting that a uniform federal definition
was appropriate), but it suggested that state law would not invalidate the agency. Id. In dissent,
Justice Black discussed the issue more directly, arguing that whether an agency had been created
should be determined under state law, and that the applicable state law did not support a finding that
an agency had been created. Iad at 320 (Black, J., dissenting).
99. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
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JURISDICTION
diction. Suppose South Dakota seeks to establish jurisdiction over the
absent parent, P, for a cause of action that arose in another state, based
upon the local activity of the subsidiary, S. In applying the merger
notion of jurisdiction, the issue is whether P and S are really "the same"
legal entity. This issue is analogous to the substantive law issue of pierc-
ing the corporate veil of P. But veil-piercing law varies from state to
state. Where undercapitalization is a basis for veil piercing, for example,
states are likely to differ on what counts as undercapitalization. 10 1 In
borderline areas, judgments about whether separate identity can be main-
tained are likely to conflict.
The substantive relations that enter into due process calculations are
primarily a matter of the law that creates the cause of action, usually
state law.10 2 The due process clause does not itself create notions of
agency, conspiracy, and the like. Federal constitutional law moderates
the affirmative efforts of states to assert power; it is not the source of the
assertion of power in the first instance.103 Furthermore, there are no a
priori or empirical theories that authoritatively connect local acts of one
individual to another individual outside the state or that categorize a
series of activities as caused by a single abstract entity such as a corpora-
tion or a conspiracy. Only normative theories perform that function in
law, and such theories are created by the states and not by the limits
contained in the federal constitution.
It is virtually a cliche that federal law interstitially builds upon sub-
stantive relations created by the states."° This is as true with the due
process limits on personal jurisdiction as with any other interface
between state and federal law. Most obviously, a state defines the sub-
stantive dispute, which has unavoidable ramifications for whether juris-
diction can be asserted. As the discussion of substitution and the direct
action example demonstrate, a state's choice about whom to make liable
affects the jurisdictional questions. In addition, when a state specifies the
elements of the cause of action, it specifies the events out of which the
case arises. This has ramifications for whether "the cause of action arises
out of events in the forum," and thus whether continuous and systematic
contacts must be shown. 105 It is to be expected that the state law would
101. See N. LATrIN, supra note 50, § 15, at 77 (no hard and fast rules to test adequacy of
corporate capitalization).
102. There may be different definitions of the scope of a corporation for purposes of federal
substantive causes of action. See, for instance, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine for federal
antitrust law. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
103. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUtiONAL LAw § 3-30 (1978).
104. See generally Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489
(1954).
105. Brilmayer, supra note I (arguing that a case "arises out of" contacts with the forum only if
those contacts are of substantive relevance to the cause of action); see also Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 427 & n.5 (1984).
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
be the immediate source of attribution, merger, and substitution law,
because states already have substantive laws performing analogous func-
tions. To treat these substantive relations as a matter of federal law
would require development of a parallel body of law governing agency,
partnership, corporations, conspiracies, and so forth.
What, then, is the proper role of federal law? There are several pos-
sibilities. One is that the state might simply do exactly as it pleases,
developing a set of state law rules to guide decision on such jurisdictional
questions concerning legal relations among legal entities. This seems
unacceptable, however. If jurisdictional issues turned entirely on what a
state chose to do or what a state thought was right, there would be no
constitutional limits whatsoever. A state could proclaim one party to be
the agent of another in any circumstance whatsoever, regardless of
whether there was any substantive or factual connection between them at
all. 106
Under such an approach, the state might model legislation after the
early nonresident motorist statutes. Those statues proceeded by way of a
fiction that a nonresident using the highways had consented to a state
official's acting as an agent for service of process. 107 Such statutes were
upheld, at least when the state official actually was required to provide
notice to the nonresident defendant.108 But could the state by analogy
simply deem a state official an "agent" for service of process over all
nonresidents, whether the accident occurred within the state or not, or
for that matter in breach of contract as well as tort cases? Naturally not;
if there are not contacts sufficient for assertion of jurisdiction, the state
should not be able to use the agency terminology in this kind of bootstrap
operation.
This example may seem fanciful; states probably would not attempt
such maneuvers. The question remains, however: what would happen if
they did? Furthermore, states have advanced somewhat comparable, if
less egregious, arguments. Rush v. Savchuk'0 9 is an example. In Rush
the plaintiff essentially argued, among other things, that the defendant
and his insurer could be treated as a single entity because of their func-
tional identity of interests.110 The substantive contractual relationship
106. One author seems to suggest this approach. See P. BLUMBERO, supra note 5, at 46
(suggesting that no constitutional issues are presented when jurisdiction over a subsidiary is
proposed on the basis of the contacts of a parent). Blumberg does not appear to believe that there
are no limits whatsoever since he proposes an analysis of enterprise liability. However, his assertion
that there are no constitutional limits suggests that these guides are a matter of state law only.
107. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
108. Id.; see also Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (statute invalidated that did not
require notice to the nonresident defendant, even though actual notice was received in the case).
109. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
110. Id. at 331. See supra text acompompanying notes 92-93, arguing that the plaintiffs' basis
for jurisdiction might be interpreted either as merger (the two defendant's contacts could be
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was urged as an adequate basis for merger.111 The Court rejected the
attempted conflation on the grounds that the defendant was a separate
party and the insurance company's contacts could not reasonably be
attributed to him.112 Thus, the Court did not allow the state unlimited
freedom. On the other hand, it wasn't entirely clear about the source of
the limits, either.
A second possible way to define the role of state and federal law is to
treat the issue as one of state law but not to allow the state to alter its
substantive law in order to expand its jurisdictional reach. A state would
be obliged in jurisdictional situations to rely on the substantive law it
uses in ordinary domestic occurrences. For example, when a state
attempted to assert jurisdiction based on piercing of the corporate veil,
the relevant standard would be the state's corporate law of veil piercing.
When it employed an agency theory, allegation of jurisdictional agency
would have to satisfy the ordinary substantive law standards of agency.
"Quasi-substantive" rules, such as the one appointing the secretary of
state an agent for service of process, could not be used to expand the
scope of a state's power to situations where jurisdiction would not other-
wise exist.
If state law supplied the relevant standard, there would nevertheless
be a federal issue involved. If the state attempted to depart from the
ordinary substantive-law standard, federal limitations would be violated.
This is a common pattern in situations where the federal Constitution
protects rights originally defined by state law. For instance, the federal
protection of "property" in the due process clause presumes a definition
of what constitutes property; this definition is typically supplied by state
law.11 3 Yet the state may not alter the definition of state-created rights in
order to defeat a federal constitutional claim."' Similarly, states may
not alter their procedural rules when federal rights are at stake. Discrim-
inatory treatment of federal rights is unconstitutional, and the Supreme
Court will review a state law decision to determine whether it has a sub-
stantial basis in state law. 115
This approach is least intrusive on state prerogatives while simulta-
aggregated), attribution (the insured was responsible for the insurer's choice to do business in the
forum) or substitution (the substantive focus was shifted to the party over whom jurisdiction
existed).
111. Id. at 329.
112. Id. at 332.
113. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 500-05 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as HART & WECHSLER]. For application of this concept to conflict of laws, see Brilmayer,
Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV.
1315 (1981).
114. See generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property" 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977).
115. See generally, HART & WECHSLER, supra note 113, at 531-38.
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEWV
neously imposing some due process limitations. It does not require the
federal courts to create a new substantive law of attribution, substitution,
or merger; it merely requires them to use state concepts neutrally when
deciding jurisdictional issues. Furthermore, this approach respects the
power of the state to determine the underlying substantive party struc-
ture of the dispute. Yet it still allows for federal oversight to protect the
due process rights of the parties. The advantages of this approach must
be evaluated, however, by comparison with a final possible way to define
the source of jurisdictional standards.
That final possibility would involve developing a body of federal
constitutional law defining the nexus that parties must have before the
substantive legal relationship obtains jurisdictional significance. To
return to an earlier example, there might be federal constitutional law
concerning undercapitalization for determining whether to pierce the
corporate veil. In some respects, this situation may be an accurate depic-
tion of what happened in Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing
Co.116 'When the Supreme Court sets out self-evident first principles, it is
in reality establishing federal law. This federal law would establish limits
beyond which the state court definitions of attribution, substitution, and
merger could not go.
While the state law model of attribution, substitution, and merger
regards quasi-substantive rules as the evil to be eradicated, this federal
law model explicitly endorses quasi-substantive rules of federal origin.
These federal quasi-substantive rules might be either more lenient or
more restrictive than parallel state substantive rules. Where they are
more lenient, these rules would allow states to depart from their usual
domestic rules of attribution, substitution, and merger, and to establish
jurisdiction in accordance with the federal quasi-substantive standard.
Where they are more restrictive, they would truncate the reach of state
domestic law. A closer look at these two possibilities suggests problems
with federal rules, regardless of whether they are more lenient or more
restrictive. We argue, therefore, that due process should take into
account only bona fide state substantive relations, and that it should
truncate such substantive relations only in certain limited circumstances.
A. When the Federal Standard Is More Lenient
Judicial movement towards a more lenient federal standard has been
most pronounced in the context of the parent-subsidiary relationship.
Perhaps because it has been misinterpreted, and in many cases because it
has been thought superseded," 7 the Cannon doctrine has been severely
116. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
117. See, ag., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483, 490 (D. Kan.
1978).
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eroded by the lower courts. 118  In moving away from the traditional
Cannon doctrine towards a more liberal jurisdictional merger analysis,
lower courts have gone in many different directions. Many, if not most,
no longer feel compelled to follow any particular standard in their analy-
sis of the parent-subsidiary relationship. 1 The merger standards
applied today range from the Cannon doctrine in its strictest form1 2 0 to
the very lenient "enterprise theory" of the corporate relationship. 12
1
The most common and least radical departure from the strictly for-
malistic analysis of Cannon is the "day-to-day control" exception. 122
Under this modem revision of the Cannon doctrine, the subsidiary must
maintain day-to-day control over its enterprise if the parent is to avoid
jurisdiction. 23 If the parent disturbs the subsidiary's control over its
daily operations, the parent and subsidiary are merged and treated as one
entity for the purpose of asserting jurisidiction. This exception requires
more than control of the subsidiary through broad general policies. As
one would expect, however, the court has a lot of discretion in defining
what constitutes day-to-day control.1
24
118. See Roorda v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 F. Supp. 868 (D.S.C. 1979), and cases cited
therein.
119. See Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 440 (1st Cir. 1966)
(interrelationship of corporations, detailed supervision, and control can make a foreign corporation
liable for the jurisdictional contacts of another corporation); Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v.
Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 332 F.2d 135, 140 (5th Cir. 1964) (substantial control of a domestic
corporation provides a basis for jurisidiction over a foreign corporation); Roorda v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 F. Supp. 868, 870-71 (D.S.C. 1979) (foreign corporation liable for the
contacts of a domestic corporation where the foreign corporation exercised many direct and indirect
controls and the domestic corporation was the sole importer of the foreign corporation's products);
Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 850 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (court will look at the totality of
incidents of control, substantiality of sales, expectations of foreign corporation, use of a subsidiary as
a "mere conduit," and subsidiary's role in the parent's integrated world operations); Fisher v. First
Nat'l Bank, 338 F. Supp. 525, 530 (S.D. Iowa 1972) (subsidiary's acting as an agent for foreign
parent will make parent liable for the subsidiary's jurisdictional contacts); Griffin v. Air South, Inc.,
324 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (substantial degree of control may subject a corporation to
jurisdiction on the basis of the contacts of its distributor); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F.
Supp. 393, 398 (E.D.S.C. 1965) (foreign corporation's control of a domestic corporation is sufficient
to make the foreign corporation liable for the jurisdictional contacts of the domestic corporation).
120. See, eg., Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, 246 F.2d 44,48 (2d Cir. 1957) (separate corporate
entities were not merely principal and agent in one organization); Harris v. Deere & Co., 223 F.2d
161, 162 (4th Cir. 1955) (despite the control exercised by the parent, the subsidiary maintained its
status as a separate corporate entity, justifying dismissal on the authority of Cannon); McPheron v.
Penn Central Transp. Co., 390 F. Supp. 943, 956 (D. Conn. 1975) ("Connecticut courts would
strictly apply the Cannon principle of formalism .... ).
121. See, eg., Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1334-35 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).
122. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 5, at 60-62.
123. Id. at 62; see also Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., 504 F.2d 1358, 1364 (10th Cir. 1974); Crow
Tribe of Indians v. Mohasco Indus., 406 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D. Mont. 1975); Cinocca v. Baxter
Laboratories, 386 F. Supp. 644, 645 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
364 F. Supp. 243, 249 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
124. See supra notes 120-22.
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More radical courts have rejected the Cannon doctrine com-
pletely. 125 The courts taking this approach generally apply an enterprise
theory to determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction is legitimate. 126
The enterprise theory looks to the degree of economic integration
between parent and subsidiary, ignoring the legal boundaries between
them. Under this theory, merger occurs when the parent and subsidiary
are part of a common enterprise that relies on the efforts of both entities
to carry out a common plan.1 27 Courts applying this standard have con-
sidered many different factors as significant to the analysis of whether a
common enterprise in fact exists. Some significant factors are:128
1. whether the subsidiary is financially dependent on the parent; 129
2. whether the subsidiary is not an independent decisionmaking
body;13
0
3. whether the subsidiary's administrative organization is
incomplete; 1
3 1
4. whether the parent and subsidiary project an integrated posture
to the public; 1
32
5. whether the parent and subsidiary interchange information, per-
sonnel, and group resources; 133 and
6. whether the parent and subsidiary present consolidated tax
returns and/or annual reports.1 34
A recent case that illustrates the complicated enterprise approach to
jurisdictional merger is Bulova Watch Co. v. K Hattori & Co. 1 35 Bulova,
a New York corporation, filed suit against Hattori, a Japanese corpora-
tion, alleging unfair competition, disparagement, and conspiracy to raid
the plaintiffs marketing staff. Hattori owned 100% of the stock of Seiko
Corporation, a subsidiary which admittedly did business in New York.
125. See infra notes 129-35.
126. For a discussion of "economic integration" as a basis for jurisdiction over related business
entities, see P. BLUMBERG, supra note 5, at 67-71.
127. Id. at 67.
128. Id. at 67-71 (listing these factors as important).
129. See Boryk v. deHavilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666, 668 (2d Cir. 1965); DCA Food
Indus. v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 574, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Bland v. Kentucky Fried
Chicken, 338 F. Supp. 871, 876 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
130. See Finance Co. of Am. v. BankAmerica Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895, 907 (D. Md. 1980);
Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 338 F. Supp. 871, 877 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
131. See Finance Co. of Am. v. BankAmerica Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895, 907 (D. Md. 1980);
DCA Food Indus. v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 574, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
132. See DCA Food Indus. v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 574, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Handlos v. Litton Indus., 304 F. Supp. 347, 350-51 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
133. See Tokyo Boeki (U.S.A.), Inc., v. S.S. Navarino, 324 F. Supp. 361, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
134. Although commonly cited as one factor relied on in the decision to merge, this reliance is
misplaced because the presentation of consolidated financial statements is usually required by
generally accepted accounting principles. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 5, at 70 n.16.
135. 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
[Vol. 74:1






















a / r annual reports.134
t
i l . ttori O.135
ti , il it i t tt i, se
,
f. i
. i f t s - .
. r is ssi f ic i t r ti n" s sis f r jnris i ti r r l t si ss
titi , . , t , t .
. . .
. r . ill ir r ft ., . , ( ir. );
. . t ll , ., . n . , . . . . ; l . t i
, , . ).
. i . f . . ri a r ., . . 5, ( . . );
l . t i i , . . , . . . .
. i . f . . ri r ., . . 5, ( . . );
I . . t r ll , I ., . . , ( . . . . ).
. ee I s. . a t rn ell , I c., . . , ( . . . . );
l . itt ., . . , . . i . .
. i ( . . .), I ., . . . ri , . . , - ( . . . .
.
. lt l it s f t r r li i t isi t r , t is r li is
is lace eca se t e rese tati f c s li ate fi a cial state e ts is s all re ire
e erall acce te acc ti ri ci les. . , s ra t , t . .
. . . ( . . . . ).
JURISDICTION
The court upheld jurisdiction, using a "common sense appraisal" of the
economic relationship between the parent and the subsidiary.136 It found
both general and specific jurisdiction by virtue of this quasi-substantive
legal relationship.
The court first addressed whether Hattori was doing business in
New York so that general jurisdiction might be proper. Since Hattori
itself was not doing business in New York as an independent entity, a
finding it was doing business there required the merger of parent and
subsidiary corporations.' 37 Through a complicated economic analysis of
the relationship between Hattori and Seiko, the court determined that
jurisdiction could be exercised over Hattori. 3 ' The court distinguished
complex multinational corporations within its jurisdiction from those
beyond its jurisdiction by using the following criteria:139 (1) the maturity
of the organization,""4 (2) the nature of the subsidiary's function (e.g.,
sales vs. manufacturing), 4' and (3) the range of the subsidiary's product
line. 142
Utilizing these quasi-substantive criteria, the court held that juris-
dictional merger was appropriate. 43 It ignored any legal distinctions
between Hattori and Seiko because "[r]eal rather than formal relation-
ships must be considered." 1" The court found decisive Hattori's practice
of marketing and expanding through its subsidiaries. Therefore, the
court merged Hattori and Seiko for jurisdictional purposes, 145 holding
Hattori subject to the general jurisdiction of the New York courts. 146
Bulova also illustrates the application of a quasi-substantive stan-
dard to attribution. The court found that specific jurisdiction was appro-
priate under New York's long arm statute. 47 In so finding, the court
attributed the subsidiary's behavior, which was the focus of the suit, to
its nonresident parent. Again, the court's method looked to the eco-
nomic realities of the case. It stated "[t]he formal trappings of agency
are not as important as the realities of the situation."'148 The court based
its decision to attribute Seiko's acts to Hattori on the fact that the parent
136. Id at 1327.
137. Id. at 1333.
138. Id. at 1335-45.
139. P. BLUMBERG,,supra note 5, at 96-97.
140. Bulova, 508 F. Supp. at 1337.
141. Id at 1336.
142. Id
143. Id at 1340-45.
144. Id. at 1340.
145. Id. at 1341.
146. Id. at 1345.
147. Id at 1347.
148. Id at 1345 (quoting Louis Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co., 453 F. Supp. 385, 390 (S.D.N.Y.
1978)).
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
was informed of the subsidiary's actions. 149
The Bulova court's rejection of a formalistic approach in favor of a
commonsense one based on economic realities has some immediate
appeal. So does the argument made by other courts that reliance on
domestic standards of veil piercing would allow out-of-state corporations
to evade jurisdiction by manipulating entity status. These courts have
sought to avoid the evil of elevating form over substance. Thus, so the
argument goes, it should make no difference whether the local corporate
actor is set up as a division of the parent corporation or as an independ-
ent corporate subsidiary. Such functionally irrelevant considerations
should have no jurisdictional significance.
There are two primary flaws in this reasoning. First, and most obvi-
ously, the very object of limited liability for corporations is to elevate
form over substance. The authoritative organs of state lawmaking,
whether legislative or judicial, already have decided to rely on artificiali-
ties rather than realities in corporate law. Corporations are legal fictions,
created for the precise purpose of allowing individuals to separate them-
selves from liability created by their commercial enterprises. It is puz-
zling, therefore, that formalities are thought relevant in one context but
not the other.
Second, the fact that substantive law, if applied to the jurisdictional
context, would allow the defendant to manipulate amenability to suit is
not necessarily bad. Again, the substantive purpose of limited liability is
precisely to allow such "manipulation". Moreover, allowing some lati-
tude for individuals to determine the legal consequences of their actions
may be particularly desirable for jurisdictional purposes. The Court has
stated that one of the purposes of the law of jurisdiction is to give defend-
ants an opportunity to predict and control the states in which they will
be subject to suit."50 But the question ought not to be whether the
defendant is protecting itself from suit. Instead, the question should be
whether the defendant in so protecting itself is undermining or furthering
the underlying policies. For instance, a defendant might protect itself
from substantive tort liability by taking precautions in the manufacture
of its products so that no injury ever occurs. This is hardly a cause for
complaint. Similarly, there is not necessarily a legitimate complaint sim-
ply because the out-of-state defendant abstains from in-state activities in
order to avoid the forum's jurisdiction.
In contrast to the Bulova approach, which allows quasi-substantive
rules with little or no qualifications, a court might be required to justify
treating a party differently for jurisdictional purposes than for local sub-
149. Id at 1346.
150. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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JURISDICTION
stantive purposes. Even under the most minimal constitutional standard
of scrutiny, differences in treatment must be subject to some reasonable
explanation.1 51 The apparent explanation in the jurisdictional context is
simply that it is not in the forum's selfish interests to extend this benefit
to out-of-state corporations at the expense of local plaintiffs seeking to
sue. But the easily perceived interest of the state in asserting jurisdiction
at the expense of outsiders is not a reason to acquiesce in its desires. It
may always be rational to promote local interests by discriminating
against outsiders, but this does not mean that there is a legitimate state
interest sufficient to make such a policy constitutional.' 52
Some authors have argued explicitly that states ought to be constitu-
tionally authorized to use quasi-substantive rules when deciding jurisdic-
tional cases because the policies behind jurisdiction and substantive law
of corporations are very different.' 53 They perceive substantive limita-
tions on liability as a means to encourage investment by protecting indi-
vidual shareholders. They argue, therefore, that these substantive
standards should not apply strictly to jurisdictional analysis because
many jurisdictional cases involve parent corporations or holding compa-
nies instead of individual shareholders.' 54 This rationale fails, however,
because no distinction is typically made between individual and corpo-
rate shareholders in the domestic substantive context. 55
Another arguable difference is that the jurisdictional rules implicate
not only the usual substantive policies but also the desire to provide a
forum for claims against out-of-state defendants. But the state also has
an interest in providing recovery for plaintiffs in purely domestic cases,
yet it subordinates this interest to the policy of limited liability. Further-
more, it is not clear that a simple interest in asserting jurisdiction ought
to be given extra weight. That position seems to beg the question. Of
course the state has demonstrated an interest in providing a forum; the
existence of a state long arm statute reveals a preference for providing a
forum. Yet this interest does not mean that the state should be allowed
to adjudicate the case solely because it wishes to. As the Court has
151. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 994-95 (1978).
152. Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985) (promotion of domestic business by
discrimination against out-of-state corporations is not a legitimate state purpose).
153. See, e.g., P. BLUMBERG, supra note 5, at 74 (maintaining that the use of veil piercing in the
jurisdictional context "involves very different considerations" than veil-piercing in substantive law);
E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS: A STUDY IN STOCKHOLDERS'
LIABILITY 61 (1936); Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF.
L. REV. 12, 14 (1925) (relationship between parent and subsidary for jurisdictional purposes is
"entirely different" than for substantive liability).
154. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 5, at 76.
155. See, e.g., id at 5-6; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 355 (3d. ed. 1983); N. LATTIN, supra note 50, at 72; see also I W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41, at 388 (rev. ed. 1983).
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
stated, the question is the minimum contacts of and fairness to the
defendant.156 The state's unilateral desire to expand its jurisdiction as far
as it can is not a good reason to allow it to do so.
In fact, this argument supports the opposite conclusion, namely that
the state ordinarily should be held to its usual substantive standards in its
jurisdictional analysis. Domestic law is formulated after consideration of
the opposing interests. In formulating jurisdictional standards, however,
the state is unlikely to be moved by the interests of the out-of-state
defendants. Most of the opponents to expansion of jurisdiction will be
out-of-state enterprises, yet that group is not in a position to influence the
legislature.1 17 This is a typical problem of interstate discrimination, and
the typical solution, of course, is to carefully scrutinize discriminatory
rules. Outsiders and insiders must be treated alike because insiders had a
voice in the political process."'
Admittedly, there may be circumstances that warrant a difference in
treatment. Sometimes the policies underlying jurisdiction legitimately
vary from those underlying substantive law. Or, the possibilities for
manipulation might be shown to be much greater than in the substantive
context, leading to a greater need to curb defendant control through for-
mal entity status. 159 However, the due process clause requires that differ-
ences in treatment be explained. A court should offer such an
explanation any time it feels tempted to ignore domestic law and apply a
quasi-substantive rule instead.
B. When the Federal Standard is' More Restrictive
For a federal quasi-substantive standard to allow greater leeway for
states to assert long arm jurisdiction than would state domestic law is
only the first of two possibilities. A federal standard also might be more
restrictive, either generally or in some applications. This possibility has
156. World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (jurisdiction may be
impermissible because of fairness even if state has strong interest in allowing recovery).
157. Virtual representation is discussed in J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT 82-87 (1980).
158. For applications of this nondiscrimination principle to conflict of laws, see Brilmayer,
supra note 113, at 1325-26; Brilmayer & Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for
Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L. REV.
819, 833 (1983).
159. An interesting comparison arises in the area of jurisdiction to tax. Formal corporate
boundaries may be disregarded under the "unitary-business" theory, which restricts manipulation of
corporate boundaries for tax avoidance purposes. See F.W. Woolworth Taxation Co. v. Taxation &
Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982). This practice seems to violate the principle against
discriminatory treatment of jurisdictional issues. In fact, however, the example supports the
principle, since sovereigns characteristically disregard entity boundaries in domestic situations to
reduce tax avoidance. See, ag., 3 B. BIrriKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTs 79.1-79.5 (1981).
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JURISDICTION
some advantages, but situations in which federal quasi-substantive stan-
dards should thus truncate state domestic policies are rare.
Cannon itself has been read to require a strict formalistic jurisdic-
tional analysis, regardless of whether a more lenient standard would be
applied in the substantive context." ° In McPheron v. Penn Central
Transportation Co., 16' a train passenger brought a personal injury action
in Connecticut against a rail transportation company and its parent cor-
poration, a nonresident holding company. Applying the Cannon doc-
trine, the court held jurisdiction inappropriate, and refused to apply
Connecticut's more lenient substantive veil-piercing standard.162
Another court held that attribution could never be sufficient grounds to
assert jurisdiction.163 It noted in dictum that "the court believes that
personal jurisdiction over any non-resident individual must be premised
upon forum-related acts personally committed by the individual.
Imputed conduct is a connection too tenuous to warrant the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.""
Restrictive federal standards like those discussed above seem prima
facie inappropriate. The most telling objection is that they might trun-
cate the proper substantive reach of a suit. Since state substantive law
would allow merger or attribution over residents, the state has a legiti-
mate interest in allowing the suit to proceed against a similarly situated
nonresident. For example, assume that under the relevant substantive
rules, the corporate veil would be pierced and the parent corporation
held liable. Assume also that the only way to obtain jurisdiction would
be by merging the parent and subsidiary into one entity. If the federal
jurisdictional standard does not allow merger in such a case, a substan-
tively proper defendant cannot be made party to the suit. In such cases,
the state's substantive interest in allowing the litigation to go forward
arguably ought to be given some weight in the jurisdictional analysis.
While such state interests form the most telling objection to federal
quasi-substantive standards, they should not be overstated. It will not
always be the case, for one thing, that the jurisdictional issue anticipates
the merits. For instance, if the parent is primarily liable and the cause of
action accrued outside the state, jurisdiction might be sought based upon
the in-state actions of a subsidiary. This would be a case of general juris-
160. See Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 296-97 (6th Cir. 1964);
McPheron v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 390 F. Supp. 943, 953-54 (D. Conn. 1975). But see Quarles
v. Fuqua Indus., 504 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1974).
The Cannon case makes no reference to the state substantive law of corporations and thus
arguably establishes a federal quasi-substantive law of corporations.
161. 390 F. Supp. 943 (D. Conn. 1975).
162. Id at 954.
163. Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
164. Id. at 873 n.14.
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
diction by merger. The argument would be that the entities should be
treated as one. In such circumstances, the merger question is relevant
only at the jurisdictional stage, not at the substantive stage. The plaintiff
is suing the party who is primarily liable, namely the parent. There is no
need to pierce the corporate veil if the plaintiff is content to sue only the
parent. But there is still a need to establish identity at the jurisdictional
stage, since the parent has no contacts of its own with the forum. In
terms of the earlier matrix, it is only cases of type A2, where the domestic
subsidiary is the primary defendant in a cause of action arising in the
forum, that the jurisdictional and substantive problems are exactly
analogous.1 65
Further, there are some legitimate reasons for federal restrictions of
state substantive standards. Since state interests do not automatically
trump considerations of fairness to the defendant, 166 jurisdiction cannot
automatically be based on state substantive law. Due process standards
require bothforeseeability and purposefulness.167 It is possible that these
requirements of constitutional fairness will not be met even though the
domestic substantive standards of attribution, merger, or substitution are
satisfied. This problem has arisen in conspiracy cases. 168 For example,
jurisdiction might be predicated upon the actions of a coconspirator in
the forum, even though it was unforeseeable to the other conspirators
that their comrade would travel to the forum and commit acts there. 169
Such cases offer problematic examples of the effect that local rules regu-
lating substantive relationships have when they are transposed into
multi-state cases.
In balancing state interests against the defendant's interests in fore-
seeability and fairness, it is worth noting that these two considerations
rarey come into conflict. There are several reasons for this fact. First,
there are foreseeability limitations on the choice of law process. 70 If the
forum attempts to use an idiosyncratic and expansive attribution or
165. In cases A and B, substantive veil-piercing is unnecessary because the parent is primarily
liable. In case B 2 the parent must be shown to be substantively liable through attribution or veil
piercing. However, the analysis will not necessarily be the same as the jurisdictional attribution or
veil-piercing analysis because what is being attributed will vary. In the jurisdictional context, the
contacts are ascribed to the defendant, but in case B 2 these contacts are not the focus, since the
dispute arose outside the forum.
166. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
167. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the Court stated that
mere foreseeability is not the test for personal jurisdiction. Id. at 286. Rather, the test also involves
whether the defendant should anticipate being haled into court in the forum, and whether the
defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state."
Id at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 78 & 84.
169. Mendelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973). Other courts have refused to go
so far. See supra notes 83-84.
170. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 318 n.24 (1981).
[V/ol. 74:1
HeinOnline -- 74 Cal. L. Rev. 36 1986
36 :
i ti
tr t . , t
l at t e j ris icti al st , t t t t ti t . laintif
i i t t
t i r t r r t il t l i ti t
are t. t t ere i still t t li i tit t t j i i ti l
t , i t t
t r t li t i , i t ,
i i r i t i
f r , t t t j i i ti al
165
rt r, t r r l iti t l
st t s st ti t r . i t t i t t t
tr i r ti i t , 166
t ti ll t t t ti .
re ire t f r s ility f l ess. 167 i i l
require ents f c stit ti al f ir ss ill t t t t
estic s sta ti e st r s f ttri ti , r r, tit ti
satisfie . is r l s ri i ir . 168
j ris icti i t r i t t ti ir t r
the foru , e e t it as f reseea le t t t r ir t r
t t t eir co rade ould travel to the forum and commit acts there. 169
s s ff r r l ti l
lating substantive relati s i s t r tr i t
lti- t t .
I ala ci st t i t r sts i st t f t's i t r t i
seea ilit a fair ess, it is rt ti t t t t i ti
rare c e i t fli t. r r r l t i . ,
there are foreseeability li itati s t i f l r . 170 t
foru atte pts to use an idiosyncratic a e a si e ttri ti r
165. In cases A and B, substantive veil-piercing is unnecessary because the parent is pri arily
liable. In case 2 the parent ust be sho n to e s sta ti el li l t r ttri ti il
piercing. o ever, the analysis ill not necessarily be the sa e as the j ris ictional ttri ti r
veil-piercing analysis because hat is being attributed ill vary. In the jurisdictional c te t, t e
contacts are ascribed to the defendant, but in case these contacts are t t e f c s, si t
is te ar se tsi t f r .
166. orld- ide olks agen orp. v. oodson, 444 .S. 286, 294 ( ).
167. In orld- ide olks agen orp. v. s , . . ( ), t rt t t t t
ere foreseeability is not the test for personal jurisdiction. ld. at 286. ather, t e test ls i l s
whether the defendant should anticipate being haled into court in the foru , and hether the
defendant "purposefully avails itselfof the privilege ofconducting activities it i t f r st t ."
ld. at 297 (quoting anson v. enckla, 357 . . 235, 253 ( 58».
168. See supra text acco panying notes 78 & 84.
169. endelkom v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 ( . . . 1973). t er c rts a e r f s t
so far. See supra notes 83-84.
170. See Allstate Ins. o. v. ague, 449 .S. 302, 318 n.24 (1981).
JURISDICTION
merger rule in the context of the jurisdictional determination, it involves
a choice of law decision that must pass muster like any other. If the
forum asserts jurisdiction based upon an aberrant substantive rule of
attribution, then it must show that the application of this rule was fore-
seeable. In one case, albeit an old one, the Supreme Court analyzed
choice of law of vicarious liability in similar terms. 171 Similarly, before a
state can substitute parties and establish jurisdiction under even a bona
fide direct action statute, it must have an adequate basis for applying its
direct action statute to the transaction.172
Second, foreseeability and purposefulness are problems that do not
arise with substitution or merger, but only with attribution. A bona fide
substantive rule of substitution that constitutionally can be applied to the
defendant as a choice of law matter will not fail for reasons of foreseeabil-
ity. In substitution, one defendant has been subject to jurisdiction all
along; the other defendant (over whom jurisdiction is problematic) is
simply dropped from the dispute. As long as there is a constitutionally
permissible suit against the defendant over whom jurisdiction exists,
there are no foreseeability (or other) objections based on due process.
Substitution is a matter of local substantive law, pure and simple. Fore-
seeability is not an issue in the merger situation for a somewhat different
reason. If, for example, it appears that a subsidiary is in reality no more
than a division of its parent, then any action that the subsidiary takes is
automatically foreseeable by the parent because the action is taken by the
parent itself. The two entities are identical; what is foreseeable by one is
foreseeable by the other. Thus, attribution is the only context in which
foreseeability is an issue because only in that case are there two separate
defendants, one of which may not have foreseen the possible liability for
certain acts of the other. Neither merger nor substitutions involve two
separate defendants.
Most substantive rules that are used for attribution purposes, how-
ever, already have elements of both foreseeability and control that satisfy
due process requirements. For example, agents are supposed to act on
behalf of their principals, and actions totally beyond the expectations of a
171. See Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933). In Young, one New Jersey domiciliary granted
another express or implied permission to take his car to New York, where it was subsequently
involved in an accident injuring a New Yorker. New York law, unlike New Jersey's, did not
recognize the New Jersey owner's immunity for loaning the car. The Court reasoned that by giving
the borrower permission to take the car to New York, the defendant was agreeing to subject himself
to New York law. Such permission made the application of New York law clearly foreseeable. Cf.
Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938) (husband, a New York resident that had never been
to Florida, held liable for wife's tort under the common law rule even though New York law had
abolished the common law rule).
172. Two examples of an adequate basis are where the accident occurs in the state and where
the insurance policy was issued there. See Watson v. Employers Liab., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (choice of
law issue in direct action against insurer).
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principal probably have exceeded the scope of the agency. 173 Regarding
conspiracies, an act is not attributable to coconspirators unless it is in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Purely private actions of one of the con-
spirators do not give rise to liability of the coconspirators.
17 4
The foreseeability provided by attribution in the substantive context
explains why existence of such bona fide substantive relations is usually
enough to satisfy due process standards. World-Wide Volkswagen typi-
fies foreseeability problems. Jurisdiction was denied where the defendant
sold an automobile to the plaintiff, who drove it into another state where
the injury occurred. In a superficial sense, this situation is similar to one
in which the defendant's employee drives the car to another state and
injures the plaintiff there. In both cases, another human being, whose
actions might have been unpredictable, caused the car to be moved to
another state, where injury occurred. In the employer-employee hypo-
thetical, however, agency attribution probably would make jurisdiction
permissible.
The employer-employee case differs from World- Wide Volkswagen
'in that, as an agent of the defendant, the hypothetical employee was sub-
ject to the defendant's instructions. Even if the defendant did not actu-
ally instruct the employee to drive to another state, the defendant
employer still had an opportunity to control the employee's behavior. In
particular, the defendant had an opportunity to define the scope of the
employment relationship and explicitly to prohibit the agent from driv-
ing the car across state lines. This option obviously is not available when
the defendant sells the car; the buyer, as owner of the car, is no longer
under the defendant's control in any way. Thus the buyer's actions are
not attributable to the seller.175
The substantive relations that have been used for attribution pur-
poses are ones that exhibit at least this minimal element of control-that
the defendant could have prevented the harm, narrowly defined the scope
of the agency, or extricated him or herself from the conspiracy. Other
substantive legal relationships that lack such elements of control have
not been used for jurisdictional purposes. For instance, although the
buyer and seller in World-Wide Volkswagen had a legal relationship, it
did not give rise to jurisdiction. Similarly, as we mentioned in the intro-
duction to this paper, the parent-child relationship does not automati-
173. See, e-g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957).
174. For example, if two defendants conspired to defraud an individual, and one of the
defendants injured the plaintiff in an automobile accident, the other defendant would not be liable
for the automobile accident unless the accident somehow had been connected with the plan to
defraud. See Althouse, supra note 69, at 243-44.
175. Cf. People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957) (seller not
subject to law of state into which buyer drove after seller made efforts to ensure that car would not
leave county).
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cally give rise to jurisdiction over the child, although the corporate
parent-subsidiary relationship may. The reason is that a child and a par-
ent do not necessarily have control over one another. In contrast, those
situations in which the parent-child relationship does demonstrate con-
trol-because, for instance, the parent is responsible for the actions of a
minor child-may give rise to jurisdiction.
State substantive law of attribution is important for jurisdictional
purposes when it demonstrates purposefulness or control. The domestic
rules of agency, conspiracy, and vicarious liability are adequate bases for
jurisdiction only to the extent that underlying constitutional policies are
satisfied. As legal doctrines, agency, conspiracy, and vicarious liability
have proven useful for jurisdictional purposes precisely because they cap-
ture intuitions ab6ut fairness and responsibility as a substantive matter.
However, it is not always true that every aspect of these substantive
doctrines will satisfy the underlying policies. Control is not the only
rationale for rules of attribution. Another policy also shapes the con-
tours of these substantive doctrines: loss distribution. A typical vicari-
ous liability rule, for instance, provides that a victim of a drunk driving
accident may sue the bartender who sold liquor to an inebriated driver.
This rule is partially based on the idea that the bartender has acted
wrongfully, and is thus appropriately responsible for injury that he or she
caused. In part, though, the rationale of this rule is that the inebriated
driver may be judgment-proof, and the bar is a more reliable source of
compensation for the innocent injured party, especially given the likeli-
hood of insurance.
Because such considerations may underlie loss shifting, residual fed-
eral scrutiny is required when a substantive doctrine is advanced as a
basis for jurisdiction.176 Loss shifting is not an adequate basis for juris-
diction because it is acceptable to shift losses only to persons within the
state's legitimate scope of authority. Since the bar, the bar's insurance
company, and the bar's other customers are not within the forum's juris-
diction, a loss-shifting rationale is impermissible. There is a federal limit,
namely foreseeability, on the extent to which even a bona fide substantive
rule can be used to attribute activities. This is not a limit that the states
have frequently transgressed. Perhaps because substantive intuitions are
structured by substantive requirements of fairness, control, and responsi-
bility, contacts rarely have been counted against defendants in inappro-
priate situations.
176. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 95 (discussing loss-shifting as inadequate basis for
jurisdiction).
19861
HeinOnline -- 74 Cal. L. Rev. 39 1986
] I TI N 39
i ti















ti t , t li li








. ilrn , t I, t ( i i l - ifti i t i f r
j ris i ti ).
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
If states adhere to the requirements of their own domestic law and
avoid quasi-substantive reasoning, due process problems with using legal
relations as a basis for jurisdiction will be minimal. The main problem
occurs when a state seeks to impose a more onerous standard of responsi-
bility upon out-of-state defendants in the jurisdictional context than upon
local defendants in the substantive context. The distinctive policies
underlying jurisdiction do not make a more expansive quasi-substantive
standard appropriate, however. On the contrary, to the extent that dif-
ferent standards should be used for jurisdictional than for substantive
purposes, these standards should be more restrictive, not more lenient.
There are two prongs to the inquiry into personal jurisdiction based
upon substantive legal relations. First, there is a state law requirement:
jurisdiction must be based upon a bona fide substantive rule and not a
quasi-substantive expedient. If the state would exonerate a defendant of
substantive responsibility in analogous domestic situations, it should rec-
ognize a comparable jurisdictional defense. Second, even a legitimate
state interest must be balanced against a purely federal consideration of
fairness and foreseeability. Some substantive relations satisfy this stan-
dard and others do not. Personal jurisdiction is appropriate only in the
former, that is, only in relations that rise to the level of fair play and
substantial justice.
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